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[Excerpt] As the largest airline union and one with a tradition of hard-nosed bargaining, the IAM and the 
role of its District 100 at Eastern have become the focus of discussion in and out of the labor movement. 
Political observers from Left to Right have hailed the Eastern settlement. 
The IAM District 100-Eastern settlement cannot be all things to all people. While the agreement contains 
many positive features, we are skeptical of claims that it constitutes a "model" for the labor movement to 
emulate in other concession bargaining situations. Our criticisms are grounded, however, in partisan pro-
labor beliefs and in an appreciation for the struggle and sacrifices made by the leaders and rank and file 
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Model Struggle, Yes. 
Model Contract, No. 
• Lance Compa & Paul J. Baicich 
As the largest airline union and one with a tradition of hard-nosed 
bargaining, the I AM and the role of its District 100 at Eastern have 
become the focus of discussion in and out of the labor movement. 
Political observers from Left to Right have hailed the Eastern 
settlement. 
In These Times calls it the fruit of "militancy and imaginative 
bargaining"; U.S. News & World Report calls it "a quiet revolution 
in the way workers and their employers reach agreements." The New 
Republic sees the contract as an example of "constructive industrial 
bargains that simultaneously benefit labor, industry and the wider 
society" and asks, "Can labor move to this higher ground?" Felix 
Rohatyn lauds it on Wall Street Week, and IAM President William 
Winpisinger calls it a concessionless contract. 
The IAM District 100-Eastern settlement cannot be all things to 
all people. While the agreement contains many positive features, we 
are skeptical of claims that it constitutes a "model" for the labor 
movement to emulate in other concession bargaining situations. Our 
criticisms are grounded, however, in partisan pro-labor beliefs and 
in an appreciation for the struggle and sacrifices made by the leaders 
Lance Compa is on the staff of the United Electrical, Radio & Machine 
Workers of America (UEj. Paul Baicich is a shop steward at IAM Local 796 
at Washington International Airport. 
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IAM District 100 has displayed a tenacity and inventiveness all 
too rare in the labor movement. For three years leading up to the 
December 1983 settlement, determined leaders and a responsive rank 
and file repeatedly turned back Eastern Air Lines' concessions 
demands. The company's demands were accompanied by an 
unrelenting stream of anti-union threats, ultimatums and attempts 
to split the members from their officers. The union's resistance grew 
out of creative efforts by District leaders to educate and mobilize 
the members, a telling contrast to the confusion that surrounds many 
labor struggles. 
In many ways the December agreement that is the subject of this 
exchange is a product of the District's exemplary struggle. While the 
settlement's "employee involvement" and "workplace democracy" 
innovations are the focus of most attention, many features are 
praiseworthy from a traditional bargaining point of view. Future 
scheduled pay raises for 1984 remained intact. The one-year term 
leaves the union a quick way out of the contract's unchartered 
territory if it turns out to be a mistake. There was no two-tier wage 
system installed, and the settlement contained no benefit cuts or 
health insurance cost-sharing—standard elements of other recent 
concessions contracts in the airline industry and elsewhere. No 
speed-up arrangements and no harsher absenteeism program were 
agreed to by the union; hard-won working conditions remained 
protected. And one of the innovations—the provision calling for EAL 
to give the most intimate business and finanical information to the 
union—is probably the most advanced in the labor movement. These 
settlement terms are in contrast to Eastern Chairman Frank Borman's 
"October ultimatum," where he demanded straight pay and benefits 
cuts along with two-tier wages and health premium co-payments and 
threatened a Continental-style bankruptcy to get them. 
All this is hugely to the union's credit. Our doubts arise, however, 
when we move off these basic trade union elements to the sexier 
"power-sharing" provisions of the agreement. Two comments by top 
Eastern management should give labor activists pause: Vice-President 
Jack Johnson's description of the agreement as "too good to be true," 
and Chairman Frank Borman's declaration, "We'd prefer to have 
gotten it all at once, but that's just not realistic. This is a first step." 
We would summarize our objections to the proposition that the 
IAM-EAL settlement is a "model" for the labor movement as follows: 
1) The wage concessions were too expensive for workers, and the 
stock ownership plan worked out in return for the wage cuts is 
unsound. 
2) The bargaining situation at Eastern was unique, so its results 
cannot serve as a model. 
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3) The "employee involvement" and "workplace democracy" 
provisions of the settlement are exaggerated; there is the appearance 
of power-sharing, but no substance. 
4) Even if substantial power sharing could be attained, the 
concessions-for-participation trade-off is not a solution to labor's 
crisis; it just diverts workers from the real job in front of them. 
1) The Wage Investment Program 
Our criticisms of the Eastern settlement begin with the sheer scope 
of the 18% pay withholding for stock purchases. An average Ramp 
Serviceman at Eastern (a "baggage handler" at the midpoint of the 
hourly pay range—mechanics are paid more, cleaners less) is giving 
up over $ 100 per week in gross pay to the Wage Investment Program, 
a substantial cut in the standard of living of EAL workers* At the 
end of the 1984 program, the average I AM member will forego over 
$5,000 of wages. About one-fourth of this sum will be diverted to 
buy shares in a common stock trust; the rest will go to purchase 
shares in a new preferred stock trust. 
Eastern is issuing 12 million new shares of common stock for the 
Wage Investment Program, which will amount to 25% of total 
common. So to begin with, workers are getting watered stock. Assets 
and revenue that underpinned 36 million shares on January 1, 1984, 
will be supporting 48 million shares on January 1, 1985 
If the common stock price holds up, employees could at least 
recover their income losses by selling their stock. But workers are 
blocked from selling their common stock until 1986, a painful delay 
for^  many anxious to recoup their lost wages. If a large number of 
workers sell when the shares are unblocked, the stock price will 
plummet. Workers who hold on to their shares will thus become 
victims of their co-workers who dumped out immediately, giving a 
new twist to the old problem of divisions in the working class. 
The preferred stock trust arrangement is equally problematic. Most 
preferred stocks pay a fixed rate of return. For the security of a fixed 
rate, the investor foregoes a chance at windfall gains, but avoids the 
risk of sharp losses, while the company gets to keep the extra profits 
from superior results. Eastern currently has three series of such 
conventional preferred stock outstanding, worth nearly $200 million. 
The Eastern settlement provides no fixed rate of return on the 
employees' stock trust. It is really a profit-sharing plan, which will 
pay employees out of 20% of net profit after paying holders of senior 
preferred stock and other creditors. In its sales pitch to employees 
on the settlement, Eastern made much of the "liquidation preference 
that places employees' preferred stock holdings ahead of common 
* An unfortunate by-product of this huge pay cut is the proliferation of "overtime 
junkies" at many stations and departments in the Eastern system. 
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stock in case of bankruptcy and liquidation of the company." But 
management's explanations failed to add that the workers' class of 
preferred stock comes behind secured creditors, suppliers and 
holders of conventional preferred stock in order of payment. As laden 
as Eastern is with debt to secured creditors, liquidation could leave 
workers holding a bag of worthless stock. 
2) Unique Circumstances Preclude "Model" 
The circumstances surrounding the Eastern settlement cannot be 
replicated in other collective bargaining situations—the first 
requirement for a model. There was an unusual balance of forces 
at work, where each side's bargaining advantage contained a 
downside risk if exercised. Eastern could try to make good on its 
bankruptcy threat, liquidate its assets and pay off its creditors. But 
would those same creditors, the banks that financed EAL's spending 
binge for new aircraft, allow it? They would hardly be pleased to 
see 278 aircraft dumped on the market—191 of them less than ten 
years old. ', V. -
After all, Boeing, Lockheed and McDonnell-Douglas were into the 
banks for billions of dollars in loansu how would the loans be repaid 
if the manufacturers could not* sell their ^planes coming off the 
production lines? 
The company could test the Continental solution and seek to 
operate in spite of a strike, but it faced the possibility of an effective 
strike, especially at its Miami dperations center where IAM Local 
702 had done such a superb job educating and involving its 
membership. The union, on the other hand, risked a Continental 
outcome if it struck. There was nd certainty that its picket lines would 
shut down EAL flights for long, with the industry in turmoil and 
many airline unions in a panic. 
With all these uncertainties, normal collective bargaining was 
turned inside-out. Instead of a balance-of-power blocking 
concessions, the peculiar balance at work here promoted concessions 
from each party. In practically every other concession bargaining 
situation, employers enjoy a decided advantage. They can extract 
unilateral concessions by applying superior force. The Continental 
solution, like the disasters at Phelps-Dodg£, McDonnell-Douglas and 
Greyhound, are testaments to this harsh reality. They, not the Eastern 
stalemate, are more typical of what unions face today. Those 
employers would scoff at union demands for "employee 
involvement" and "workplace democracy" in exchange for economic 
concessions. The labor movement would be better served devising 
"models" to address that kind of corporate power instead of 
promoting the anomalous Eastern settlement as a model. 
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3) Superficial "Power-Sharing" 
Many labor activists argue that concessions can be a positive price 
worth paying for union participation in investment, pricing, plant 
location and other major management decisions, as well as for more 
say in the day-to-day running of the business. Here is the real 
breakthrough in the Eastern model: the "power-sharing" features 
of the agreement that give workers a voice in managing the company. 
We find it misleading to characterize Eastern's concessions to the 
union as power-sharing. One finds repeated reference in the 
settlement to the union's right to review, advise, participate and 
appeal, but little in the way of effective power. The four worker seats 
allotted to the I AM District 100, the Air Line Pilots Association 
(ALPA), Transport Workers Union (TWU) Local 553 and non-union 
salaried employees on the 20-member Board of Directors (28, 
counting advisory directors) do not reflect the 25% employee stock 
ownership. Furthermore, that salaried workers chose the president 
of a private investment firm and ALPA chose a prominent 
Washington corporate lobbyist as their representative to the Board 
only accents the illusion of worker "power" via board of director 
seats. 
Eastern Air Lines' 1984 proxy statement warns that the two bona 
fide union representatives on the Board—IAM District 100 President 
Charles E. Bryan and TWU Local 553 President Robert V. Callahan— 
may have to withdraw from decisions involving labor-related matters 
"because of conflicting obligations." In effect, Bryan and Callahan 
may be precluded from casting their directors' votes in just those 
areas where their members have the most at stake. We do not want 
to be misunderstood on this point of criticism: there is a potential 
conflict, and a union leader's first obligation is to his or her union 
and its members, not to the corporation and all itg stockholders. We 
think it is fine that Charlie Bryan sit on the Board, get a feel for its 
politics and give them a piece of his mind, but no one should see 
this as an exercise of worker power. 
Management also maintains a 3-to-2 majority on the pension fund 
board of trustees, even though 100% of the fund is arguably deferred 
wages that workers should control totally. On key corporate issues 
such as Eastern's business plan, its finanical restructuring and its 
capital expenditures, the union can review, comment and register 
disapproval, but the upshot of the union's disagreement is that "Board 
minutes shall reflect the specific dissent' position and rationale 
presented by the union." In the end, in other words, the union 
proposes—and the company still disposes. 
^ A a ^ 
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4) The Fallacy of "Workplace Democracy" 
It may be argued that the technicalities of the Wage Investment 
Program, the stock trusts, union participation in management and 
other nuts-and-bolts clauses of the Eastern settlement are really 
secondary issues. The important thing is the principle, the break with 
the sterile economism of "porkchop unionism" and the creative move 
toward workplace democracy and worker control. Like Frank 
Borman, a union advocate of the IAM-Eastern settlement and its 
concessions/participation trade-off can say it's just a first step. / 
Our doubts persist. The limited participation features of the Eastern 
settlement are seen as revolutionary precisely because they are as 
much as can possibly be gotten from a big company like Eastern. 
Workplace democracy and worker control are devoutly to be wished, 
but they are contradictions in terms in a capitalist society. They are 
as unattainable as full employment—another favored slogan of labor 
activists—without a fundamental restructuring of our economic 
system. 
What passes for workplace democracy today boils down in practice 
to employee buyouts of aging, non-competititve firms on the 
periphery of the economy, quality circles and quality-of-work-life 
charades, labor-management productivity committees, profit-sharing 
and stock ownership plans, symbolic seats on boards of directors, 
a look at the company's books with a right to "review" and "advise," 
and like measures to promote the appearance of enlightened 
managers and empowered workers. All the while, real control stays 
firmly in management hands. 
The big corporations are tightening their grip on the economy and 
proceeding apace with job-slashing, mergers, robotization, runaway 
shops, strikebreaking, wage-cutting and other steps to destroy the 
bargaining power of organized labor* 
The conflict between labor and management is not ended by 
employee-participation or workplace-democracy schemes. It just 
takes on different forms. Even in the most enlightened of these 
experiments, management's superior power has always reasserted 
itself. Linked to a labor movement in the ascendant—organizing new 
workers, winning new wage and benefit gains, exercising substantial 
* There is nothing new in any of this, contrary to the claims of both labor and 
management proponents of such "innovations." In the 1920s, the "New Capitalism" 
was all the rage, with labor leaders and management calling for a new spirit of 
cooperation in the workplace that would made industrial conflict obsolete. Cooperation 
would guarantee productivity. Productivity would guarantee profits. Profits would 
guarantee jobs and rising wages. Workers would then buy stock in their companies, 
and the vulgar division of society into workers and capitalists would be replaced by 
one big family of owner-operators. Unions could help their members in this grand 
scheme, not by fomenting strife, but by making the success of the firm their paramount 
task. Those unions that stood in the way, stuck to the old adversarial attitude, were 
dinosaurs doomed to extinction. Sound familiar? 
;j?j; 
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political and legislative power—there may well be a place for 
carefully developed programs of employee participation and 
workplace democracy. But when the corporations are running 
roughshod ov^r workers and their unions, breaking organizing 
campaigns and strikes, cutting pay and benefits, winning anti-labor 
laws and court decisions, to raise the banner of employee 
involvement and workplace democracy is Utopian and diversionary. 
It is Utopian because our economic system is based on management 
control of the workforce and the workplace. American management 
is not going to concede real power, least of all when it can extract 
cost-saving concessions by the exercise of superior bargaining 
strength, without any quid pro quo. 
The union quest for workplace democracy is also a diversion 
because it focuses attention and energy on the problems of one 
company, rather than the problems of all workers in the industry 
and elsewhere. The Eastern settlement fails to address the problems 
of unions in the airline industry—deregulation, union-busting, and 
the abuse of bankruptcy laws—let alone the problems of other 
American workers suffering under the ravages of Reaganomics. 
An emphasis on "workplace democracy" or "worker control" in 
the single enterprise binds workers tighter to the process that causes 
their problems in the first place. Instead of being a member of a 
union, a worker in a trade, an employee in an industry or more 
broadly a working-class person with interests that unite him or her 
with other workers in our society, each worker becomes a tiny 
entrepreneur. Wrapped up in the narrow concerns of the business, 
employees will now be fretting over the price of their stock, the 
amount of the dividend, the need to cut costs, raise productivity, beat 
the competition. What role can such an inner-directed group of 
workers play in the broader social and political struggles of the IAM 
International in particular, and of the American labor movement in 
general. 
Perhaps the biggest risk in positing the concessions/participation 
trade-off at Eastern as a model for the labor movement is that trade 
unionists, in their anxiety for innovative solutions to the wrenching 
problems that beset them, will abandon the basics: tough bargaining 
to protect and advance living standards, careful strike preparation 
and militant strike conduct, an effective steward system and 
grievance procedure to solve workplace problems, a healthy 
skepticism of management motives, a striving for industry-wide 
organization and contract settlements, and independent political 
action for legislative and electoral gains. There is a strong allure to 
a "new strategy" of trading concessions for power-sharing, as if it 
will somehow ease the pain. 
None of this is meant as an indictment of IAM District 100. It 
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would not be fair to expect a single union, even a progressive, militant 
group like IAM District 100, to turn back the anti-labor assaults being 
mounted by the airline companies and the corporations generally. 
That task belongs to the labor movement and its allies in a political 
struggle for power in the whole of society. Unfortunately, with only 
20% of the work force organized, with weak bargaining power, shaky 
political clout and little public support, the labor movement is in no 
condition to mount such a struggle. 
That is the situation that needs turning around, not the substitution 
of "workplace democracy" for "porkchop unionism." In this effort, 
there is indeed an IAM District 100 model for the labor movement 
to emulate: its exercise of rank-and-file democracy, a leadership that 
stays close to the members and emphasizes membership education 
and mobilization, its no takeaway stance on industry standards and 
working conditions, the creative use of research and pro-union 
consultants, and the rest of its determined struggle of recent years. 
But the December agreement and its trade of wage concessions for 
stock ownership, profit-sharing, directors' seats and a say in running 
the business is not a model. As a basic strategy for labor, it falls into 
a management trap which seeks to make working people agents and 
partners in the economy's crisis. A better strategy is to copy the 
genuine IAM District 100 model and look for a way out. 
Conclusion 
An important prop of the IAM settlement with Eastern was the 
approval by the company's major lenders of the company/union 
arrangements through 1984. This one-year grace period dovetails 
nicely with the expiration of the IAM contract in December, 1984. 
We can reasonably expect that EAL management will be coming back 
to the workers to go through their pockets again; after all, as Frank 
Borman said, the latest contract was just a "first step." 
Will the company be holding out additional management 
concessions as a quid pro quo for further pay reductions? We suspect 
that Eastern exhausted its supply of carrots in the form of employee 
involvement and stock ownership proposals. The company will more 
likely come in this time with the big stick: give us more money, or 
we'll go Chapter 11 and operate without you. Of course, the company 
will not have to take this position if the union succumbs to 
management assumptions and adopts management's viewpoint that 
labor costs are the root of the company's problems. 
Eastern has no intention of sharing real power with its workers. 
The company wanted a fast $300 million, and was willing to go 
through certain contortions to get it—issuing watered stock, opening 
up token labor seats on the board, permitting a business review 
process, etc. What the company really wants is to share the problems 
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created by its own mismanagement. By shifting the burden of 
management mistakes to the workers' shoulders, the company can 
press them to bail management out. The basic issue in the Eastern 
settlement, whose outcome is yet in the balance, is whether the union 
has boxed itself into a collusionist posture where it is constrained 
by management logic to bail the company out with concessions on 
union wages and conditions, or whether it can stay on the offensive 
to force the company into needed reforms of managment practices, 
expecially in the areas of equipment expenditures and sloppy 
management* 
Given the District's overall past record, it is not likely to fall into 
a management trap, and will resist further concession demands by 
Eastern. In the end, the December 1983 agreement heralded as a 
revolution in collective bargaining may only have postponed for a 
year an old-fashioned showdown between a militant union and an 
anti-labor managment. In that case, what the union gained in 1984 
was a year's time, not a solution to its members' problems. And that 
time was very expensive. 
* A recent "best and worst" survey by Fortune magazine asked corporate executives, 
board members and financial analysts to rate 250 U.S. companies. It found that EAL 
ranks 231st in "innovativeness," 245th in "community and environmental 
responsibility" 247th in "quality of management," 247th in "ability to attract, develop 
and keep talented people," 249th in "use of corporate assets" 250th in "long-term 
investment value," and 249th overall. These are the views of Eastern management's 
peers, not union critics. 
